


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RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 1617  
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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEE HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

FOR ACDA/DIRECTOR ADELMAN; SHAPE/FOR GEN. ROGERS AND POLAD

USSTART

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PARM, START

SUBJECT: (U) POLANSKY/OBUKHOV POST-PLENARY DISCUSSION  
NOVEMBER 29, 1983

1. THIS IS START MEMCON V-M-064. SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MEETING DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 1983
  - TIME: 12:06-2:10 P.M.
  - PLACE: U.S. ACDA BUILDING, GENEVA
3. PARTICIPANTS: U.S. U.S.S.R.
  - AMBASSADOR SOL POLANSKY MR. A. A. OBUKHOV
  - DR. EDWARD M. IFFT MR. V. N. ZEMSKOV
  - MR. STEPHEN SOUDAKOFF, INT. MR. YE. M. ZOLOTOV, INT.
4. SUBJECT SUMMARY: CODEL VISIT, FBS, U.S. APPROACH, BUILD-DOWN/INF, STABILIZING/DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS, CRUISE MISSILES, HEAVY BOMBERS/ALCMS.
5. OBUKHOV, NOTING THAT MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION WOULD BE SEEING SENATORS LEVIN AND SPECTOR THIS EVENING, ASKED POLANSKY TO COMMENT ON WHAT KIND OF QUESTIONS THE SENATORS WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING, WHAT THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS WERE, AND WHY THEY WERE HERE. WERE THEY IN EFFECT ADVISERS TO THE U.S. DELEGATION, OR INSPECTORS WHO IN SOME WAY WERE LOOKING AT THE WORK OF

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THE U.S. DELEGATION? POLANSKY PROVIDED BRIEF BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON THE SENATORS, NOTING THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THE COURSE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, THAT THEY WERE INDEPENDENT MINDED OFFICIALS WHO WOULD BE ASKING THEIR OWN QUESTIONS, AND THAT THEY WERE NEITHER INSPECTORS OR ADVISERS. POLANSKY ALSO NOTED THAT THE SENATORS WERE AWARE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. OBUKHOV THEN SAID HE WISHED TO DRAW ATTENTION TO AMBASSADOR KARPOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF TODAY. A NUMBER OF POINTS WERE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE. TO DATE, THERE HAD BEEN NO PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD A START AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE U.S. CONTINUED TO CLING TO ONE-SIDED PROPOSALS. THE SITUATION FURTHERMORE HAD BECOME LESS PROPITIOUS BECAUSE OF THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. DEPLOYMENTS WERE NOT AIMED AT IMPROVING THE CONFIDENCE OF BOTH SIDES. RATHER, THE AIM WAS TO MOVE U.S. WEAPONS WITH FIRST-STRIKE CAPABILITY NEAR SOVIET BORDERS. DEPLOYMENT VIOLATED THE ROUGH GLOBAL EQUILIBRIUM IN STRATEGIC ARMS, AND WAS INTENDED TO GAIN UNILATERAL U.S. ADVANTAGE. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RESPOND, AND THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF SOVIET COUNTER MEASURES. AS A RESULT OF U.S. STEPS, THE KNOT OF PROBLEMS WOULD BECOME EVEN TIGHTER AND MORE DIFFICULT AND THE U.S. WOULD SEE THE RESULT. RESULTS HAD ALREADY BEEN SEEN IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. OBUKHOV WENT ON TO SAY IT WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILE MATTER. AS A RESULT OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT, A NEW AND UNFAVORABLE SITUATION HAD BEEN CREATED. THE SOVIET UNION HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE FACTORS INFLUENCING IT.

7. WITH RESPECT TO OTHER POINTS IN KARPOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT, OBUKHOV ASSERTED THAT THE U.S. ALWAYS TALKED ABOUT EQUALITY FOR BOTH SIDES, BUT IN FACT THERE WAS NO EQUALITY IN U.S. PROPOSALS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. WAS PROPOSING THE SCRAPPING OF SOVIET MODERN ICBMS WITHOUT ANY COMPARABLE CONSEQUENCE FOR U.S. FORCES. IT WAS ALSO PROPOSING A SEPARATE LIMIT OF 400 FOR HEAVY BOMBERS, WHICH WOULD CODIFY A MORE THAN THREE-FOLD ADVANTAGE FOR THE U.S. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. WAS TRYING TO INCLUDE THE SOVIET BACKFIRE AS A HEAVY BOMBER. FURTHERMORE, THE DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. MISSILES CLOSE TO SOVIET BORDERS WAS DESTABILIZING SINCE SUCH MISSILES HAD A SHARPLY REDUCED FLIGHT TIME TO THEIR TARGETS.

8. POLANSKY SAID HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT OBUKHOV'S ASSERTION THAT A LACK OF PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT WAS DUE TO ONE-SIDED U.S. PROPOSALS. IN THE CURRENT ROUND, THE U.S. HAD MADE A MAJOR PROPOSAL IN BUILD-DOWN AND IN PRECEDING ROUNDS WE HAD MODIFIED OUR POSITION TO TAKE

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INTO ACCOUNT EXPRESSED SOVIET CONCERNS. NOR COULD POLANSKY ACCEPT OBUKHOV'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MEANING OF U.S. DEPLOYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE OR THAT THE KNOT OF PROBLEMS HAD BECOME MORE DIFFICULT AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THESE DEPLOYMENTS. POLANSKY SAID HE DID NOT WISH TO

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DISCUSS IN DETAIL OBUKHOV'S REMARKS ON DEPLOYMENTS, NOTING IT WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL TO USE THE TIME IN POST-PLenary SESSIONS TO DISCUSS MATTERS DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE START NEGOTIATIONS. POLANSKY DID WISH TO POINT OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE WAY TO LOOSEN THE KNOT OF PROBLEMS WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO RETURN TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. POLANSKY SAID THERE WERE A NUMBER OF POINTS IN KARPOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT ON WHICH HE WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENT AND CLARIFICATION, AND PARTICULARLY THAT PART DEALING WITH A 20 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THROW-WEIGHT IN SOVIET MISSILES. POLANSKY SAID HE WOULD ASK OBUKHOV TO COMMENT FIRST ON KARPOV'S THROW-WEIGHT STATEMENT.

9. OBUKHOV SAID HE WISHED TO RESPOND IN SEQUENCE TO THE COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS POLANSKY HAD RAISED. OBUKHOV THEN WENT INTO A LENGTHY AND STANDARD CRITIQUE OF U.S. PROPOSALS, CLAIMING THEY WOULD RESULT IN A BUILD-UP OF 15,000, 17,000 OR EVEN MORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN ADDITION, U.S. DEPLOYMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE WOULD RESULT IN A SHORT FLIGHT TIME OF U.S. MISSILES CAPABLE OF REACHING THE SOVIET UNION. TURNING FINALLY TO THROW-WEIGHT, OBUKHOV READ RAPIDLY THROUGH THE RELEVANT PART OF THE PLENARY STATEMENT.

10. IFFT THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO POSE A QUESTION, BASED ON KARPOV'S PLENARY REFERENCE TO SHORT FLIGHT TIMES. DID KARPOV'S STATEMENT IN EFFECT MEAN THE SOVIETS WERE ACKNOWLEDGING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH COULD BE MORE OR LESS STABILIZING DEPENDING ON THEIR FLIGHT TIMES?

11. OBUKHOV RESPONDED THAT IFFT UNDERSTOOD PERFECTLY WELL WHAT WAS MEANT BY FLIGHT TIME. THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 30 MINUTES IN FLIGHT TIME FOR ICBMS, AND 6 MINUTES FOR MISSILES THE U.S. WAS DEPLOYING IN WESTERN EUROPE. THE FLIGHT TIME OF THE MISSILE INDICATED THE AMOUNT OF WARNING TIME INVOLVED IN A NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK. FOR EXAMPLE, A SIDE WOULD HAVE A LITTLE LESS THAN 30 MINUTES TO DETECT AN ICBM LAUNCH. LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES OF ALL BASING MODES PROVIDED VIRTUALLY NO DETECTION OR WARNING TIME SINCE THEY WERE DESIGNED NOT TO BE SEEN BY RADAR. THE BEST SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE TO BAN ALL LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES OF ALL BASING MODES. HOWEVER, SINCE THE U.S. HAD NOT BEEN READY FOR SUCH A PROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED A COMPROMISE, NAMELY TO LIMIT RATHER THAN BAN AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES SO LONG AS THERE WAS A TOTAL BAN ON GROUND AND SEA-LAUNCHED LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. THERE SHOULD BE NO AMBIGUITY IN U.S. THINKING THAT DEPLOYMENTS OF MISSILES IN EUROPE WOULD NOT HAVE A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE ON THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

12. IFFT NOTED THAT IN PREVIOUS PLENARY STATEMENTS THE SOVIETS WERE SAYING THAT VARIOUS WEAPONS SYSTEMS WERE CONVERGING IN THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND THAT ALL WERE EQUALLY STABILIZING OR DESTABILIZING. AT THE SAME TIME, IF THE SOVIETS WERE MAINTAINING THERE WAS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN FLIGHT TIMES OF 30 MINUTES FOR ICBMS AND SEVERAL HOURS FOR HEAVY BOMBERS, HOW COULD THEY THEN SAY THAT THERE WAS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN FLIGHT TIMES OF 30 MINUTES AND 10 MINUTES? THERE WAS, IN IFFT'S VIEW, QUITE AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

13. OBUKHOV TOLD IFFT HE SHOULD NOT TRY TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE. THE FLIGHT TIMES THAT WERE BEING DISCUSSED WERE IN TERMS OF WARNING TIME WITH RESPECT TO A NUCLEAR ATTACK. THE WARNING TIME FOR ICBMS WAS APPROXIMATELY 30 MINUTES. WHILE THE FLIGHT TIME OF LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES WAS LONGER, THEY WERE DESIGNED TO ARRIVE ALMOST UNNOTICED AT

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THEIR TARGETS. EVEN THOUGH THE PRESENT SPEED OF CRUISE MISSILES WAS LESS THAN THAT OF ICBMS, THIS SITUATION COULD ALSO CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS. THE EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE WARNING TIME FOR CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE REDUCED TO ZERO OR A MINIMUM.

14. IFFT INTERJECTED A QUESTION, ASKING OBUKHOV TO COMMENT THEN ON THE WARNING TIME FOR MASS TAKE-OFF OF HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED WITH ALCMS. OBUKHOV ASSERTED THE SOVIETS HAD DISCUSSED, BUT NOT IN DETAIL, HOW LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES COULD BE USED IN A FIRST STRIKE. THE SOVIETS HAD DEMONSTRATED, OBUKHOV SAID, HOW CRUISE MISSILES COULD BE EMPLOYED IN A FIRST STRIKE SINCE THERE WERE WAYS TO COORDINATE THEIR ACTIONS WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE. OBUKHOV WENT ON THAT U.S. ASSERTIONS THAT CRUISE MISSILES WERE BEING DEPLOYED NEAR SOVIET BORDERS FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERRENCE SIMPLY WERE NOT BORNE OUT BY STATEMENTS BY INFLUENTIAL U.S. OFFICIALS. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH DEPLOYMENTS WAS TO HAVE FIRST-STRIKE WEAPONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION. TO BUTTRESS HIS ASSERTION, OBUKHOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO QUOTE FROM A SENATE HEARING ON THE SALT II RATIFICATION PROCESS, AND NAMELY FROM SENATOR HELMS, WHO SAID THAT CRUISE MISSILES WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HOLDING SOVIET ICBMS HOSTAGE AND THUS RESTORING U.S. LEADERSHIP. THE POST-PLenary SESSION ENDED AT THIS POINT. ROWNY

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